Press Release

Joint Media Briefing by National Security Advisor Mr. M.K. Narayanan; Foreign Secretary Mr. Shivshankar Menon; Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy & Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. Anil Kakodkar and Director (SPG), Department of Atomic Energy Dr. R.B. Grover

(XP Hall, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi; July 12, 2008)

 National Security Advisor (Shri M.K. Narayanan): Ladies and gentlemen of the press, I think we shall dispense with all the formalities because I know you would like to hear what Dr. Kakodkar and Dr. Grover have to say. However, I wish to say that the idea of having this kind of a panel is primarily to clarify and explain any of the doubts that still exist in the minds of most of you about the Safeguards Agreement and where we stand on this issue.

As far as possible we are trying to keep the politics out of it. The technicalities and the technical aspects are reasonably esoteric. I know Siddharth wrote a very good piece today in The Hindu. But I presume there are some people ignorant like me who would like to be sort of informed as to what really the Safeguards Agreement stands for, what it means, and what it has meant for us in terms of the effort that we have put in.

If there are any side issues which arise as a result of the discussion, Foreign Secretary and I would then intervene. But I would request that please use your time usefully, if I might say so, because I think it is not often that you get the Chief Negotiator for the Safeguards Agreement Dr. Grover, or for that matter Dr. Kakodkar to be with us all on the same panel. Let us avoid grandstanding; let us avoid very clever questions; and just try to seek information. We will be as candid as possible; we promise to be as honest because I think there is a lot of that we need to get from the press in trying to explain to the country why the Safeguards Agreement is important from the point of view of the civil nuclear initiative that is being attempted.

With this I would leave the floor open for questions. You can direct the questions primarily to Dr. Kakodkar and Dr. Grover in terms of, as I said, the principal item that we are discussing today, viz., the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.  

Question: * Yeh Safeguards Agreement baaki agreements se kaise alag aur behatar hai, aur kaise India ke liye fayademand rahega?

Chief Negotiator (Dr. R.B. Grover): This particular agreement is for the civilian nuclear facilities in India. This has a Preamble and the main text can be broadly divided in three parts, i.e., General Considerations, Safeguards Procedures, and Miscellaneous Aspects where we cover various issues related to implementation, finance, visa-related issues and so on. As you might have seen from the Safeguards Agreement, right in the Preamble we have embedded several important concepts. We start with issues like sovereign and inalienable right of India to carry out nuclear research and development activities for the welfare of its people. We talked about expanding international cooperation on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. We also have mentioned about the relevance of Indo-US understandings which are mentioned in quite a detail there. Of course, it is about civil nuclear cooperation with all other member states of the Agency.

If we see Safeguards Procedures, they are based on the way safeguards are carried out. They follow the relevant guidance documents which have been adopted by the Board of Governors for this purpose. It is embodied in a document called Infcirc-66. The General Considerations in the beginning stem from specific Indian requirements. You might have noticed that General Considerations are in the initial part where we have Basic Undertakings, General Principles, Items Subject to this Agreement, Declaration and Notification, Provision of Information to the Agency. These are specific to India and that is what makes it an India Specific Agreement. Normally, if we have 66 types of Safeguards Agreement, they are specific to a facility. We have similar agreements with regard to the reactors under construction at Kudankulam. We have Safeguards Agreement for reactors at Tarapur – TAPS-I and TAPS-II. But, though Safeguards Procedures are based on Infcirc-66, this is an umbrella agreement and it will be applicable to all the civilian nuclear facilities in India, those civilian nuclear facilities which we declare as per Article 13 and subsequently notify as per Article 14. All these provisions make it India specific.

Then we go to the third part where miscellaneous issues are indicated. They include agency inspectors, how to give them visa, physical protection, system of accounting and control, finance, non-compliance and cooperation, interpretation and application of agreements, and settlement of disputes, and with the definitions. This is the general structure.

I can go on but I think it would be better if you ask questions. If I start doing this, there will not be any time for you to ask questions.

Question (Parul Malhotra, CNN-IBN): Sir, this question is open to any of you who might choose to answer. I just want to understand the reference to uninterrupted fuel supply and the right to take corrective measures etc., which find reference in the Preamble. Does the Preamble have legal sanctity in case the need arises? Why was it necessary to have this reference in the text? Why was it necessary for India to have this mentioned in the text?
Secondly, what is it about this agreement that makes it India-specific?

Foreign Secretary: On the issue of legal sanctity of the preamble and whether there is a distinction, there is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which deals with exactly these questions. Article 31 of that says that the Text includes the preamble and annexes. So, when you come to General Principles, general rules of interpretation of the treaty, these are actually part of the treaty. In this particular case it is made even more clear because you will see at the end of the preamble it says, “Now, therefore, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed …”. So, frankly, this distinction that some people have drawn really does not matter and has no legal effect; there is no legal distinction. Also, in the text itself parts of the preamble are described as essential basis for India’s agreement to accepting safeguards on certain facilities.

National Security Advisor: I think the link between the preamble and the text has been very clearly brought out, if you read the entire text. I do not think it was necessary, but we made it doubly sure that nobody could draw any kind of erroneous conclusions about this. So, I think the connection between the preamble and the text, even if that may not be necessary, has been very clearly made. I think that is one of the strongest points in the agreement because the entire text flows from, as the Foreign Secretary just now said, “taking into account the following”, because it stands on that one basic pillar.  

Dr. Grover: To answer the second part of your question, IAEA has certain templates with regard to going in for safeguards. Infcirc-66 type template is the one which is meant for those states which have not signed NPT. That is the category to which India belongs. There have been some reports in the press where they have said that this is an agreement for non-nuclear weapon states. That is not the case. Infcirc-66 template is for non-NPT states. No qualification with regard to having nuclear weapons or not having nuclear weapons. We have followed with regard to safeguards procedure, this particular template. But what all the agreements, which have been executed so far as per this template, do is write certain clauses and make reference to 66 and are applicable only to a particular facility. Here what we have done is we have tried to include whatever our requirements were in the Preamble, in the General Considerations, continuing till about Article 22. All those considerations specific to India are embedded. And it is applicable to all the facilities which we declare as civilian and notify to the Agency. So, this is a unique feature which has been attempted for the first time. This is a standalone document. It does not make reference to Infcirc-66 anywhere. That makes it India-specific. It is for the first time that this particular procedure has been followed because our requirements were of that kind and they have been reflected fully here.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: I think the point to recognize really is, as Dr. Grover said, this is an umbrella agreement applicable to the civilian nuclear facilities that India declares to be civilian and also to recognize the fact that it applies to only to civilian facilities. There is a non-hindrance provision which in fact explicitly says that it has nothing to do with the rest of the Indian programme. So, in that sense it is quite India-specific. 

Question (Manish Chand, IANS): Sir, assurances about uninterrupted fuel supplies which are incorporated in the document appear more like a statement of intent. It does not clarify how the Government is planning to ensure that Tarapur fiasco is not repeated. Could you tell us how the Government is planning to actually put together this entire arrangement so that India’s safeguarded nuclear reactors will have uninterrupted fuel supply?

Chief Negotiator: Let us first say that IAEA is not the agency which supplies fuel. IAEA is the agency through this particular Safeguards Agreement one has to create those conditions which help us to proceed further for importing fuel and using it in our reactors. Fuel supply assurances have to be embedded when we go in for imported reactors at that stage. Suppose the way we have gone in for Russia, we are setting up two reactors in technical collaboration with Russia at Kudankulam. In that particular agreement, fuel supplies for the lifetime operation of the reactors are embedded. What we have done in this agreement is we have made provision that we can have that kind of strategic fuel reserve and use it when we want for the lifetime operation of the reactors. IAEA cannot give us fuel. It sort of creates a bank and we have to fill that account as and when we want to fill it by getting fuel from other sources. If you particularly see here, I will give a specific reference. This is again an India-specific feature here. You go to 11F where we have said any facility and said for storing nuclear material. So, safeguards have to be applied to that particular fuel which we import and that provision we have built in here. In the preambular paragraph we had listed all the conditions. So, we have created a total framework and now we will have to go in for agreements with fuel suppliers which will help us in the lifetime operation of the fuel.  

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: Any supply agreement has to be between the supplier and us. So, we will have to build in, as we have been doing always, strong commitments on the part of the supplier to continue, whether it is fuel or spares or whatever. Now, with regard to the foreign supply, it has been our policy right from day one that whatever comes from outside we have been putting under IAEA safeguards. In this Safeguards Agreement we have very strongly connected such cooperation agreements with other countries and the supply commitments with the supplier countries with our going in for safeguards with IAEA. For example, there is a statement, “an essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept agency safeguards under an India-specific safeguards …” and then it talks about the fuel supply agreements. So there is this linking which has been done, which says that we are going in for the IAEA safeguards because we are also talking about the supply agreements where the continuity is built in. And then we can develop it legally from that point onwards.

Question (Pallava Bagla, NDTV): I have two questions. Could you specify very clearly whether India will be in a position to withdraw reactors or facilities which we put under safeguards as part of this umbrella agreement? Secondly, taking forward a question which was there, can you elaborate a little more on the corrective measures?  

Chief Negotiator: Let us hope that the whole process will move in a way that whatever commitments we enter with other countries and other countries enter with us, will be honoured, and there will not be any requirement where there is a fuel supply disruption and we have to go in for withdrawal of reactors from safeguards. But supposing that kind of a situation arises, we have made a mention right in the preambular paragraph as to why we are going in for this safeguards agreement. We have also indicated right in the main text, Article 4, where we say “the application of safeguards under this agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of relevant bilateral and multilateral arrangements”. And these arrangements will be fuel supply arrangements. Then we say, under 13, that we will go in for determination by India that all conditions conducive to accomplishment of the objectives of this agreement are in place. So, it is explicitly stated as to how we will proceed further with the implementation of this agreement. The fuel supply, we have to determine, yes. Those assurances are in place. Once they are in place and subsequently there is some deviation, then, if you see, we are providing as a first step for a kind of reporting to the IAEA, which is under 52C, where is a disruption of operation of facilities in the Annex on account of material violation. Now, we have entered into a fuel supply agreement; there is a material violation that we made provision first for reporting in 52C and then after we report, this kind of provision should help us in such a situation….(inaudible)……will help us to take whatever steps ….(inaudible)… conditions will not arise.  

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: First we are talking about the sustained fuel supply. Then we are talking about the stockpile which is sufficient for the lifetime operation of the reactors. Then we are talking about, if in spite of all that there are difficulties, of course, implementing corrective measures. In this agreement, as you heard, if there is a disruption in supply we would report to the Agency and we have all these linkages built in. So, we can also start our process. The point to notice is the discontinuity in the operation of the reactor cannot happen suddenly because we are talking about several layers. So, we will have enough time to kind of force correction on the part suppliers themselves. Because we will have the stockpile, we can carry on. So, there is no question of disruption of the reactors. So, as we have been always saying, we are talking about the permanent safeguards on the basis of permanent supplies. The question of corrective measures, which has been built in, essentially arises if this understanding is breached. That is the point.

Question (Pallava Bagla, NDTV): Sir, my question was very simple. Can we withdraw or not? You gave me all round and round, but did not tell me whether we can withdraw. Simply tell me whether we can withdraw.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The response has to be always calibrated. I am not talking about a response to your question. The corrective measures or corrective actions that India would take, it would depend on what is the disturbance, what is the threat to continued operation of the reactor. It is a thing which India can decide at respective point of time. I describe corrective measures as unspecified sovereign actions. 

Question: Does it include legal measures?

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: It includes everything. There is no restriction.

Question (Smita Sharma, IBN7): Two questions, one is to Dr. Kakodkar. Sir, there are two points that are being raised as objections by the scientific community. One is, since we are talking about the fuel supply, it does not. speak of in perpetuity. So, what about reactors that we might build in future? Does that also come into the picture? And the nuclear status not being accorded to India. Mr. Narayanan, if you could please answer, going back to 123, because there is still an ongoing debate about 123 being bound by Hyde Act. To a layman or in categorical terms if you could say, if India nuclear test fires tomorrow, what happens to the deal?

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: I thought in terms of fuel supply I have clarified already in sufficient detail.

Question: How do you see the future reactors? 

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The question is, any reactor that India declares as civilian, it will be first of all an Indian sovereign decision. One of the test for declaring, or making such a declaration, is that the reactor should be eligible for supplies, or the reactor should be eligible for the full civil nuclear cooperation. So, that linkage will always be there whether it is for the present reactor or a future reactor. This is a part of the understanding that if something is declared as civilian, it has to be eligible for the external civil nuclear cooperation. So, that defines everything. With regard to your second question, first of all let us be clear, we are a nuclear weapon state. We know that, and the world knows that. These definitions of nuclear weapon state and non-nuclear weapon state are definitions embedded in NPT. We are not a party to NPT. So, I do not think we should worry too much about those definitions. The fact is, we are talking about opening up of civil nuclear cooperation fully recognizing that this cooperation domain is restricted to the civilian facilities that India so declares and also recognizing that there is a part of the programme which is outside this. So, the strategic programme is completely insulated. Now, we have a nuclear weapons programme and that programme is insulated from this. So, what more is necessary? Certainly we do not have to really be so attracted towards NPT definitions because we are not a part of NPT.  

National Security Advisor: The experts have been speaking. I do not know, I do not understand why there is still such a big question mark about fuel supply assurances. Subject to correction by Dr. Kakodkar and Dr. Grover, hopefully this India Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA will facilitate the processes by which we can get foreign fuel. If I understand it right, every reactor that will come will need a specific contract for the supply of foreign fuel. If I understood right, for the next forty years if you have a contract the contract remains and you have a stockpile. So, if somebody wants to disrupt that, at that point I do not know what he is going to achieve. If for some arcane reason it becomes necessary to do that, we have corrective measures. So, I think the issue of fuel supply assurances, unless I have missed out something on this, does not seem to be the issue here. I think Dr. Kakodkar said very pithily, if there is no perpetual supply there is no perpetuity of the safeguards. But taking the thing off this kind of what I would call the semantics, I think if we have an IAEA safeguards agreement, and if a foreign supplier comes with a reactor, then we have a fuel supply agreement with him, and we have the right to go in for a stockpile. There may be a cost to it, I do not deny, but I do not think the cost would be as high as 150 dollars a barrel or 200 dollars a barrel and the kind. So, I think that is not basically an issue to the extent that it seems to be being made out. I think that is what we wanted to clarify to this audience.

I will come to your second question. The same question is being asked over and over again and so I thought I will try and put it in as much of a layman’s language as I can, provided I am right in what I have said.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: You are absolutely right.

National Security Advisor: Now, the issue is, in the 123 agreement there is no reference to the Hyde Act. There is a reference to cessation of cooperation. It may be under any number of circumstances. What we have done in the 123 agreement, I think it is Article 14 if I remember right, is that the circumstances under which a cessation of cooperation has been sort of induced ….(inaudible)…the security scenario in the neighbourhood, etc., would be taken into consideration. So, it is in that context that the thing has been done. The Hyde Act is a US Act. The Separation Plan that we had was primarily an Indian document. The 123 is an India-US document, and hopefully the IAEA will be an international document. I think we have gone step by step in moving up the ladder in this matter.

Question (Royden D’Souza, Headlines Today): Dr. Kakodkar, two questions to you. In 2006 when I interviewed you I asked you about the transfer of technology that India could do to other third world countries, especially Southeast Asia. What provisions are there for transfer of technology under this Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA? This also pertains to reactors that we might build in this interim period because we have a specialty in smaller reactors that we could export to other countries.

Second question is with regards to reactors that we build with our own homegrown technology - the FBTR, Kamini, BFBR, Hot Cell Facilities, other research, and fuel fabrication facilities. What assurances do we have that this technology will not be tapped into by the IAEA or any other country because the IAEA inspectors would like to have access to these also? 

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The export of any nuclear items or dual use items from NSG members are governed by NSG guidelines. As you know, India has been maintaining a very tight export control right from day one. So we had no difficulty in harmonizing our export control guidelines with the NSG guidelines. So, we have a strong export control in place. Within that framework we are free to export the nuclear items to countries who may wish to buy. As far as this safeguards agreement is concerned, this is a safeguards agreement for safeguarding facilities in India that we may ask IAEA to safeguard. So, whatever we will export to country ‘x’, we will insist on that country to subject that to IAEA safeguards. But that will be governed by safeguards agreement between that country and the IAEA. I hope I am clear about this.

With regard to your question about protecting the IPR as it were, as I mentioned the decision of what we declare as civilian and what as not is our own sovereign choice and this is very well stated, established and embedded in all documents. At this moment there is no question of putting FBTR or Fast Breeder Reactors under safeguards. So, that question does not arise. Even so, the Draft Safeguards Agreement does provide for protection of our commercial interest. It is already embedded there. Safeguards inspection, one must understand, is restricted to ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material. It is a detailed procedure. You have to define and envelop key measuring points and things like that. So, there is no obligation in terms of sharing the technology. It can be done. When we work out the detail we have to write the details in such a manner that IAEA is satisfied about non-diversion, and we are satisfied about protection of our own IPR also. The point is we have long experience about implementing IAEA safeguards. We have been doing it since Tarapur days, and there has been never any difficulty of this kind. So, I think that issue does not arise. 

Question: This question could be answered by either Mr. Menon or Mr. Narayanan. I want to know how things will unravel in the next few months till the President of the United States signs the document. Out of the 45 NSG members, how many of them have given an assurance to us that they will support us, and how many are likely to create some problem or the other? Are they in single digit or more than that? Of course, Mr. Menon has said something about China not likely to create any problems when it comes up for a hearing at the NSG. So, what are the things we are planning to do to persuade people who are not exactly very enthusiastic about this to neutralize their opposition and see that we have no problems to get through the NSG? 

Foreign Secretary: I hope the things do not unravel! I do not expect them to unravel. I do not think that is the word I would use for the future. But what we expect next is really that we go to the IAEA Board whenever it decides to meet. If they approve the Safeguards Agreement, then the NSG considers a clean, unconditional exemption for India from the guidelines. There is a fair amount of commonality to the composition. I think 19 members of the IAEA Board are also members of the NSG. We have spoken to the NSG informally; we have met the members also in the past. In previous NSG meetings we have been briefing them about where we are. Our impression as a result of these conversations with the various members and as a result also of various outreach activities that we have undertaken - one cannot predict the future; I mean I cannot say what will happen on that day; we are not astrologers here - is that we would hope that there would not be any hindrance in this process going through smoothly. It will certainly be our endeavour by contacting various countries and working with them. One good sign recently was, you saw the G8 Chairman’s Statement at the end of the meeting where he endorsed robust civil nuclear cooperation with India. We have to keep working at this obviously as the process proceeds, and we will have to see once it becomes clear we will talk to all our friends around the world. 

Question: Sir, I would like to ask this question to Mr. Narayanan. Could you give us the sequence of events on which date precisely did India move the draft agreement at the IAEA to the Board and then subsequent actions?

National Security Advisor: Why is this question being asked of me? But anyway, I think the Board was moved on the 8th, if I remember right, of this month soon after the Left Front said that they did not wish to have the meeting which had been scheduled on the 10th of this month. The idea earlier had been that the External Affairs Ministry who is the Chief Interlocutor on behalf of the UPA could meet up with the Left Coordination Committee meeting. That would have been the final meeting according to the schedule that had been drawn up at which the findings of both sides would be discussed and after that they were supposed to come back to the Government. For reasons which are now well known, the Left decided not to wait for the 10th, and on the 7th night or 8th morning announced that they were going to withdraw support from the Government and they were planning to go to the President on the 9th. Therefore, the necessity of waiting for another meeting with the Left in case they had some other constructive suggestions to add to the draft which was on the anvil did not exist. So, a decision was taken after consultation that we will move the IAEA Board on the 8th so that enough time was available to the Board to have the papers circulated and whatever discussions they needed for the Board of Governors meeting which we hope would be towards the end of this month. I do not know, that is up to the Board. So, that is the sequence.  

Question: They were to withdraw support on 8th but they went to the President only on the 9th. You requested the IAEA …

National Security Advisor: Our commitment was not about withdrawal of support or giving support. Our commitment was that we would wait till the last meeting was held before we went to the Board in case the Left had something to say. Since they said they had nothing further to say and their next step was that they were going to withdraw support, little purpose was seen in keeping this issue hanging. The issue of support, lack of support, withdrawal of support, was not the issue.

Question: But, Sir, you had already initialled the document on the 7th and by that time the Left parties had said nothing.

National Security Advisor: Who said we had initialled anything on the 7th?

Question: Dr. Kakodkar went on record saying that the Draft was initialled on the 7th.

Foreign Secretary: Just to make it clear, a negotiator initials a document in token of that being the document that he has finalized. That is what it means. Initialling a document only means that a document is initialled by both the negotiators as to prove that this is the document we have agreed. That is it. That is all it constitutes. When you negotiate a document, you finalise a document, you want to be sure that you both have the same text, that you know what you have agreed. So, when a negotiator initials a document, that is all it does. It is in token of that being the document that has been agreed.  

Question: But the Government would not initial until there was concurrence.

Question: Why did you initial on the 7th when you had already frozen the text a while ago? Have not you frozen it a while ago? Was it frozen on the 7th and, therefore, initialled on the 7th?

National Security Advisor: Let us get the facts straight. A formal letter to the Board signed by the Indian member on the Board of Governors was sent on the 8th evening, after the Left had already announced. That is where the matter is. That is the formal declaration saying that we are going to the Board of Governors.

Question: The question is to the NSA. A lot has been said about the need for India to keep its options open for future nuclear tests. But there is a point of view that nowadays over-ground tests or underground tests or undersea tests are no longer required, and in fact these tests can be done in the laboratory. What is your take on that?

National Security Advisor: My take on that is that I ask Dr. Kakodkar to answer this question because if it is in a laboratory, quite clearly he is the man or Dr. Grover as the case may be.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: As you are all aware, it is the stated policy of the Government that the R&D in strategic area would continue, and that includes everything that is done in the laboratory. All of you are also aware that the Government has voluntarily declared a moratorium on nuclear tests. So, that is the position as of now.  

Question: If a laboratory test is conducted, will it be considered violative of the voluntary moratorium?

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: No, moratorium deals with explosive nuclear tests.

Question: This is a very simple question. There is some confusion. Only a few days ago the Science and Technology Minister said that once the Safeguards Agreement is approved in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, it will go to NSG and then it will go to US Congress; and only when it is approved there, the Safeguards Agreement will be signed by the Government of India. Is that true?

National Security Advisor: The sequence that has been drawn up is that after the IAEA Board of Governors endorses or approves the agreement rather, and NSG then gives us a clean exemption. Then the United States had said that they would like the agreement to go to the US Congress for an up-down vote. We are at liberty to sign this maybe even three years later, as Dr. Grover explained in great detail. We are at liberty to file a declaration at a moment when we think it is necessary and when we believe that all the conditions that we think appropriate have been completed. So, the question is as to when and where we will. But quite clearly we categorically require an affirmative report in the IAEA. We also require a clean exemption from the NSG. Those two are cardinal aspects. The US Congress would help the US to then enter into a nuclear trade with us and help us in our nuclear scene. Having helped us, we are all equally keen that the US should be part of the wider nuclear trade. When we will go in for a declaration, when we will finalise it, will depend on Dr. Kakodkar and company being sure that all the necessary conditions that we think are appropriate and have been fully fulfilled.  

Question: This question is directed to any of the members present here. In case of a dispute between the two parties, who is the arbitrator? Where does it get solved? I think it mentions that the matter would be resolved between the two parties concerned. The question specifically is, is there any international tribunal to which the matter can be referred or is it a matter of negotiation between the two parties?

The second question is more of an opinion based one. At what rate can we get power? At what unit rate can power generation be done after this civil nuclear cooperation is signed?

Chief Negotiator: If you see, in the Safeguards Agreement there is a section on long-term plans where we have clearly listed that this issue will be first discussed with the Board authorities, and the procedure is indicated here. And then we also say, I think it is in Article 10, “Nothing in this agreement affects other rights and obligations of India under international law”. So, these two together will help us to ensure that in case there is any dispute we are able to resolve that dispute.  

National Security Advisor: If I might introduce a certain amount of levity into the proceedings, we have not yet signed a prenuptial agreement on this question.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: As you correctly observed, at what rate can we set up new nuclear power plants. It really depends on how things evolve. That is one part. But if you look at it from the other end, as to at what rate the Indian infrastructure would allow nuclear power stations to be set up. I am sure all of you are aware that today we are building six power stations simultaneously. There was a time when we were building nine power stations simultaneously, and all of them completing construction in time. So, it looks to me that taking up construction of ten, twelve units simultaneously is well within the Indian industrial infrastructure capability. If there is a need, it can be even higher. So, I do not think there is any serious limitation in terms of the rate at which the Indian system can absorb, particularly in the context of strong, dire necessity of addition of electricity generating capacity in the country.

Now, to come back to the other side that what rate we will get it. You know these negotiations are complex issues. Several issues have to be handled; several things have to be tied up; and that does take time. It is not as if this is done and we will be able to finalise these negotiations just like that. They have to be gone through in each one of the cases. So, that will add some initial delay. But more than that it is very difficult to predict. But you get some idea of the upper bound and the lower bound.

Question: A very quick question to Dr. Kakodkar. Sir, if you have initialled the text on the 7th of July, does that mean that the negotiations were carrying on till the 7th? Why did you initial it on the 7th? The other question is on the story in The Hindu a few days ago which said that the IAEA had no problem if the text was shared with other parties. And one of the things that the Left has been saying is that why did not you share the text? So, if you could just answer my questions, Sir.

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: Let us recognize that just like any other negotiation this negotiation also has been a long drawn affair. There have been several discussions taking place till the last moment. When everything was known to be satisfactory, once the two negotiators come to an understanding that yes everything has been done you initial it. I only gave a factual information that it was initialed on the 7th.

With regard to your second question, I think this has been already said.

Foreign Secretary: There is a simple answer to it. Until a text is finalized you cannot share it. No negotiating text is made public. It is not fair to your negotiating partner until it is finalized; nor is it fair to the process itself. You are still negotiating the text. So, it is just not done until it is finalized. We told you when it was finalized.

Question: It was finalized on the 7th, Sir. You went public with the document on the 10th.

Foreign Secretary: We have answered that.

Question: But it has been said that it is a confidential document between Government of India and IAEA Board and cannot be shared with anybody. Why then was it made public?

Foreign Secretary: It is not confidential with the IAEA Board until it is put to the Board. It has not been put to the Board before the end of the 8th. So, I think there is complete confusion in your mind. It is a negotiating text. A negotiating text cannot be made public until it is finalized. Once it is finalized, the negotiators’ initial in token of that being the text they have agreed, full stop. On the 8th evening, we asked them to go to the Board, as the NSA made it clear. So, please do not confuse a very simple process.  

Question: What kind of role can we expect the Indian private companies to play in nuclear power generation, Sir?

Question: If I may I add to that, just the other day you went to the Cabinet asking for a lot of land for existing power stations. So, clearly are you looking forward to sort of broadening that? Do you have in mind the fact that we want to have a lot of plants?

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: The Atomic Energy Act as it exists now permits the nuclear power generation business to be done by a Government company; and the definition of a Government company is one in which there is 51 per cent shareholding of the Central Government. That position stays. We, of course, want to expand the nuclear power generation capacity. So, it is an ongoing process where we keep identifying more and more sites and also look at the possibility of adding new power units at the existing sites. As a part of this process, because land acquisition and all takes time, we are creating possibilities. It is a kind of a delegation where NPCIL can once the Government approves the site - first the site has to be approved by the Government - go ahead and acquire the land. We are, of course, interested in adding more capacity. So, we are looking at, as I said earlier, adding more units at the existing sites as well as looking at new sites. That is an ongoing activity. If you identify a site today, by the time you start construction there may be two, three or sometimes even four years’ gap. So, you have to prepare for that much in advance.

Question: Sir, the US Congress breaks for the August recess very soon. We have to go through the Safeguards Agreement at the IAEA; and then you have to go to the NSG. Are you confident of making it at the US before the Bush regime becomes a lame duck government? Will we be able to see the India-US civilian nuclear deal finally?

Foreign Secretary: We do Nishkama Karma. 

(Concluded)

*Transliterated from Hindi.

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